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ABSTRACT
Stanford's Space Systems Development
Laboratory (SSDL) has initiated a new
space system technology initiative in
order to develop, demonstrate, and
validate a beacon monitoring system for
spacecraft. This system consists of
automated fault detection on board a
spacecraft, a state of health beacon signal
broadcast by the spacecraft, a ground
based monitoring network, and a mission
control center capable of efficiently
integrating this health assessment
strategy into its operating architecture.
SSDL is investigating this technique by
identifying fundamental design drivers,
developing a system responsive to these
drivers, and deploying the resulting
system on microspacecraft and within
SSDL's developing, global, automated
space operations network. This paper
reviews the beacon monitoring concept,
describes the design criteria for such an
operations strategy, and presents the
current development of the SSDL beacon
system.

INTRODUCTION
The spacecraft industry regularly
cites its failure to incorporate operational
concerns into system design drivers.

This fault typically leads to inefficient
and human intensive mission control
activities that can account for up to 60%
of total program costs. 1
Autonomy is often praised as a
technology capable of reducing costs and
enhancing performance in space mission
operations. Through careful deployment
within the overall mission architecture,
automation can augment or replace
human decision making in order to
increase reaction speeds, reduce errors
and stress, mitigate cognitive overload,
enhance safety, lower costs, focus
analysis, cut bandwidth requirements,
and free human reasoning for strategic
tasks requiring high levels of robustness. 2
System health management is a
specific mission operations task that has
been enhanced through the use of
automation technologies. The space
industry routinely uses ground based
expert systems to analyze spacecraft
telemetry and detect the existence of
faults. While this model has proven to be
beneficial in reducing the workload of
human controllers during nominal
operations, it still requires full use of
scarce ground equipment and bandwidth
resources in order to deliver spacecraft
telemetry to the control center.
To address this drawback, many
developers in the spacecraft community
advocate the migration of detection

capability from the ground to on board
the spacecraft. This new model requires
the on-board reasoning system to
perform realtime health assessment and
to use a "beacon" to report the vehicle's
status to the mission control center.
Composed of, at most, a few bits of
information, this beacon signal will
summarize the spacecraft's status. When
healthy, a "Normal" or "I'm OK" signal
will reduce the need for routine health
assessment contacts thereby conserving
resources. When a fault exists, an
"Emergency" or "Help Melt signal will
trigger notification of controllers and can
be used to initiate a variety of
contingency operation functions.
The Air Force is studying the
feasibility of such a system for
incorporation into the Air Force Satellite
Control Network (AFSCN).3 Similarly,
NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory is
planning on implementing such a system
within the Deep Space Network for its
Pluto Express mission as well as its series
of New Millennium Program spacecraft.4
As these organizations are learning,
however, the beacon monitoring model
of fault detection poses a number of
additional design challenges that must be
considered. Because of the nature of
these networks, however,
implementation and validation of such
systems has been slow. To prove the
value of the beacon monitoring concept,
SSDL is preparing to conduct a real
world evaluation through the use of
microspacecraft and a global, automated
space operations network.

designing beacon monitoring systems
clearly point to a variety of benefits in
reducing human and ground resource
requirements for nominal spacecraft
operations. But because this model
radically alters the location of decisionmaking authority and the distribution of
information, beacon monitoring also
creates a variety of additional design
challenges that must be addressed by the
overall space system.
First, the on-board monitoring
process must be robust enough to detect
complex and unanticipated faults while
also reducing false alarms. While the
current crop of ground based expert
systems can be fragile in this respect, the
availability of the full spacecraft
telemetry stream at the mission control
center permits simple and timely human
intervention when required. Since
beacon monitoring reduces the amount
of telemetry available for human analysis,
advances in detection capability are
required.
Second, the beacon signal itself
must convey a small but appropriate
amount of information in order to initiate
actions throughout the ground segment.
The choice of the number of bits in the
signal is therefore a direct function of the
responsiveness of the mission
architecture. Also, the beacon signal
should be broadcast on a nearly
continuous basis in order to provide
quick notification to the control center.
Third, a suitable beacon receiving
network is required. Typical spacecraft
operations require directional and/or
dedicated ground station equipment in
order to contact vehicles. The whole
notion of beacon monitoring, however, is
based upon conserving resources. For
this reason, a communications link based
on exploiting excess station capacity or

DESIGN DRIVERS FOR A BEACON
MONITORING SYSTEM
As has been stated, the ongoing
industry and government programs for
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simultaneously utilizing equipment is
required. The previously stated desire
for timely signal reception further leads
to a requirement for deploying beacon
receiving equipment throughout the
world. Of course, these distributed
recei ving stations must be linked to the
mission control center through some sort
of readily available communications
network.
Fourth, the mission control center
must efficiently exploit a received beacon
signal by automatically notifying
operators, allocating resources for timely
contact with the vehicle, and preparing
engineers for in-depth vehicle analysis.
Concerning this last point, current use of
automated ground based fault detection
systems is already highlighting the
challenge of keeping human operators
fully apprised of the spacecraft's state
and operating conditions. Because
beacon monitoring can be used to reduce
the amount telemetry being transmitted
to the ground, this challenge is
magnified. Additionally, a sudden
Emergency signal, especially after
months of nominal and unattended
operation, can generate significant
operator stress which can lead to poor
judgment and errors. This can be
partially addressed through automated
referral to contingency action plans and
engineering documentation.

satellite of SSDL's Satellite Quick
Research Testbed (SQUIRT) program.s
The second is a new operations research
project known as the Automated Space
System Experimental Testbed (ASSET)
program.

The SAPPHIRE Microsatellite6
The SAPPHIRE satellite, shown
in Figure 1, has three primary missions.
The first of these is the space
characterization of newly developed
micromachined tunneling infrared
sensors. These non-cryogenic sensors
have been jointly developed by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and Stanford
University. The other missions are
providing photographic and voice
broadcast services to the public through
the use of modified, commercially
available, non-space rated components.

Figure 1 - SAPPHIRE Bus in
Integration Testing

THE SSDL TESTBED SYSTEMS
The beacon monitoring
investigation is drawing upon two
testbed systems already under
development within SSDL. The first of
these is the Stanford Audio Phonic
Photographic Infrared Experiment
(SAPPHIRE) microspacecraft, the first

The SAPPHIRE bus is a 35
pound hexagonal cylinder measuring 8"
on a side and II" tall. The structure is
constructed plimarily from 0.5"
aluminum honeycomb and consists of
four modular, stacked subsystem trays.

3

The power tray contains a single ten cell
NiCad battery and 5/12V DC-DC
converters. The communications tray
consists of a modified HAM radio
transmitter, receiver and terminal node
controller. The processing tray holds the
Motorola 68332 CPU, 256 Kb of RAM,
256 Kb of hardened ROM, and serial
interfaces. The payload tray contains two
banks of IR sensors, a modified Logitech
Fotoman camera, and a modified voice
synthesizer. SAPPHIRE is finalizing its
operational testing and is awaiting
integration with a launch provider.

for SQUIRT microsatellites as well as
other university and amateur spacecraft.
The second goal of this system is to
serve as a comprehensive, low inertia,
flexible, real world validation testbed for
new automated operations technologies.
Figure 2 shows a high level view of the
ASSET mission architecture. The basic
components include the user interface, a
control center, ground stations,
communications links, and the target
spacecraft. During the current
development phase, a highly centralized
operations strategy is being pursued with
nearly all mission management decision
making executed in the control center.
These tasks include experimental
specification, resource allocation
throughout the ground and space
segment, fault management, contact
planning, data formatting and
distribution, and executive control.

The ASSET Program2
The ASSET system is a global
space operations network under
development within SSDL. This first
goal of this system is to enable low-cost
and highly accessible mission operations

Stanford Mission Control Center
System

Spacecraft: SAPPHIRE, OPAL,
WeberSat, Dove. AO-16.JAWSAT.
PANSAT. SEDSAT

Station

World Wide Web Interface

AcademicNetwork: Stanford. Ogden.
Monterey. Mexico City. Huntsville.
Tuskegee. Rome, Moscow. Kiruna

Figure 2 - The ASSET Space System Architecture
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WeberSat, a Weber State
University and Amateur Satellite
Organization spacecraft launched in
1990, and SAPPHIRE, the first SSDL
SQUIRT spacecraft currently being
completed, are presently being integrated
into the ASSET system. In addition,
controllers for five other satellites have
expressed interest in becoming part of
the system. As for ground stations, the
Weber State and Stanford ground
stations are the first two facilities to be
included. Seven other stations
throughout North America and Europe
have been identified for future
integration.

spacecraft being in either" Standard
Mode" or "Safe Mode. SAPPHIRE
usually operates in Standard Mode. In
this mode, all satellite functions, such as
payload operations and multi-user
contacts, are fully available given the
constraints of standard operating
procedures. Safe Mode, on the other
hand, tenninates previously configured
payload activity, places the spacecraft
into a low power mode, and limits
spacecraft functionality by pennitting
only a single "superuser" to command the
spacecraft. Safe Mode is automatically
initiated on-board SAPPHIRE based
upon predetennined critical conditions
such as a low battery voltage. Safe
Mode is also the default CPU mode so
that unanticipated CPU rebooting will
limit the vehicle's functionality until the
spacecraft is properly configured.
Given these two levels of vehicle
functionality, the first question for the
design of the beacon monitoring system
concerned the resolution of the signal
itself. Although the spacecraft modes
suggest the use of a two state beacon,
the use of this criteria for selecting the
number of beacon states is inappropriate.
The beacon function is essentially a
transform that maps the large set of
spacecraft states to a concise set of
appropriate ground system reactions. So
while various spacecraft states are
reduced to one of two functional levels, a
broader set of ground reactions is
relevant.
For example, while the vehicle
senses and safes itself due to critical
conditions, routine telemetry analysis can
often pennit forecasting of future
emergencies so that anomalies can be
more gracefully addressed or even
averted. SAPPHIRE has basic on-board
telemetry limit checking capability which
1I

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SAPPHIRE/ASSET BEACON
SYSTEM
While general design drivers for
an optimal beacon monitoring system
have been outlined, the specific
implementation of such a system within
the SAPPHIRE/ASSET testbeds is
limited due to computational capability
and development resources. While this is
unfortunate, it is believed that a partial
implementation of an ideal system will be
enough to judge the value of the beacon
strategy.
This section outlines the design
and implementation of the system
currently under development. In doing
so, it describes the on-board capabilities
being added to SAPPIflRE, the beacon
recei ving system, and the response
actions being integrated into ASSET.

SAPPIDRE Beacon Generation
Functional capability on the
SAPPHIRE vehicle is governed by the
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Mode
1

2

3
4

Beacon Mode
Nonnal
Abnonnal
Critical
Emergency

Vehicle Mode
Standard
Standard
Safe
Safe

Vehicle Status
Healthy
Out of Limit Telemetry
CPU Controlled Safe Mode
CPU Reset Induced Safe Mode

Table 1- SAPPHIRE Beacon and Vehicle Modes

can be used to signal operator attention
to potential faults. In addition, while the
vehicle's Safe Mode will always limit the
level of functionality on-board
SAPPHIRE, the means of entering Safe
Mode has a direct consequence on how
the mission control center should recover
operations. For example, Safe Mode due
to a CPU reset will have cleared the
spacecraft's time, RAM based operating
biases, mission data, and stored
commands. Less drastic events occur
during a CPU controlled Safe Mode.
For these reasons, a four tone beacon
signal is being implemented as shown in
Table 1.
The SAPPHIRE CPU controls
the beacon state based on its
understanding of realtime telemetry.
This infonnation is compared with a table
of upper and lower limiting values for
important signals such as component
temperatures, currents, and voltages.
The limit values are commandable so that
analysis can evolve with nonnal
operating conditions. For example, solar
panel current limits will be modified over
time so that solar cell degradation will
not be detected as a fault. In addition,
the SAPPHIRE limit checking system
can operate at an aggregate level in order
to provide more focused analysis. For
instance, the current from a single solar
panel will typically vary between zero
and some maximum nonnallevel of
output. An additional and much stronger

check can be made, however, by ensuring
that all solar cells are not near their
maximum allowable level at the same
time (SAPPHIRE's geometry prevents
the sun from illuminating all panels at the
same time). Finally, SAPPHIRE's limit
checking is context sensitive so that
different expected ranges are applied to
realtime telemetry based upon the
estimated state of the vehicle. An
example of this is that during an eclipse
the battery should be discharging.
Satisfaction of all of these limit checking
routines will maintain the beacon in its
Nonnal Mode setting (Mode 1).
Violation of any of these checks will
trigger Abnonnal Mode (Mode 2).
While Abnonnal Mode serves as
an indicator for ground operators,
violation of a few specific telemetry
checks will result in a CPU initiated Safe
Mode. In this mode, all instruments are
shut off, the command database is
cleared, the spacecraft is placed into its
low power mode, and CPU access is
limited to a single superuser. In addition,
the beacon system is placed into Critical
Mode (Mode 3). Battery voltage is the
primary check for initiating this sequence
of activities. A significant drop in battery
voltage means that it is overloaded;
persistent use of the spacecraft would
jeopardize battery survival and thus the
mission. It takes operator instructions to
bring SAPPHIRE out of any Safe Mode;
thus, even a return to nonnal telemetry
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ranges will not result in a return to
Standard Mode.
As defined in SAPPHIRE's boot
code, a CPU reset will place the
spacecraft in vehicle Safe Mode and in
Emergency beacon mode (Mode 4).
Such an event is caused by gross power
mismanagement, watchdog timer resets,
or ground command; as such, its
occurrence is more serious than a CPU
initiated Safe Mode and needs to be
specially treated. Operator commands
are required to return to Standard Mode.
Figure 3 depicts a high level
diagram of SAPPHIRE's on-board fault
handling. As has been seen, SAPPHIRE
relies on analysis of its telemetry values
to identify problems. Obviously, faulty
telemetry lines are a problem that can
disguise faults or generate false alarms.
If a bad telemetry line is identified, it can
be effectively removed from the limit
tables. In addition, the entire beacon
monitoring process is a commandable
option; should it be determined that the
CPU can no longer manage this system,
it can be turned off. Also, vehicle Safe
Mode is an end state; once SAPPHIRE
enters this mode, it no longer takes any
action based on the telemetry checks.
Finally, changes in vehicle and beacon
modes are logged in an activity file on
the vehicle.

Assess
Spacecraft
State
Choose
Proper Limit
Table
Perfonn
Limit

Beacon

If CPU
Resets,
Initiate
Vehicle Safe
Mode and
Beacon
Mode =4

Figure 3 - SAPPHIRE's On-Board
Fault Handling

will forward received signals to mission
control centers through Internet or
modem connections. The development
of these stations is being conducted
through educational initiatives with
Tuskegee University and the Space
Engineering School in Kiruna, Sweden.
For test purposes, SSDL is using small,
portable, omnidirectional, laptop based
receiving stations in order to develop the
end-to-end beacon monitoring system.
Because the most effective and
responsive use of the beacon requires a
high degree of signal availability, these
receive stations are planned for

Beacon Reception
The next stage of the monitoring
system is the reception of the beacon
signal. Unless SAPPHIRE is in contact
with ground operators, the beacon is
broadcasting at all times. Simple,
receive-only, HAM radio frequency
stations are being designed to acquire the
two-bit beacon signal. These stations
will accommodate multiple vehicles and
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deployment at every ground station
currently being integrated into the
ASSET system. This will provide a high
level of coverage across the United
States and Europe. An initiative with the
Air Force is currently underway to locate
some of these systems at various AFSCN
ground stations throughout the world.
This will significantly enhance coverage
of the beacon network.

diagnosis, and recovery techniques are
being developed in order to aid the
operator once full fledged contingency
analysis begins. This capability is
essential to the success of the beacon
concept since operators will not be
intimately familiar with spacecraft
behavior once automated fault detection
capability is established and trusted. In
later versions of the beacon system, onboard fault summarization will be
included; this will enable the advanced
documentation and fault management
functions to be integrated directly into
the overall beacon monitoring system.
An open issue in the design of
ASSET's response is how to deal with
on-board mission data when the CPU
initiates a vehicle Safe Mode. Clearly,
after a CPU reset, all data is lost, and
ASSET must terminate active
experiments or reschedule them to
collect data that was lost. But in a CPU
initiated Safe Mode, the data is likely to
still be on board and intact. Because of
fault analysis and recovery requirements,
there may be some time before this data
can be returned to the control center, or
it may be lost during the recovery
process. To ignore data that is available,
however, is an inefficient use of limited
spacecraft and ground resources. The
trade, then, is to determine the conditions
under which the data "trapped" on
Sapphire should be salvaged or given up
for lost. This issue is being resolved
through experimentation and assessment
of the beacon system.

Beacon Response
Based upon the state of the
beacon signal, the mission control center
must perform a set of appropriate
actions. The beacon's value is always
recorded. If the mode is anything other
than Normal, an automated notification
function informs operators of the
beacon's state. This can be achieved
through electronic mail, audible alarms,
and automated paging services. In
Abnormal mode, the scheduling of
additional contact with the vehicle is
currently being left to the discretion of
the operator on call.
If the beacon is in either Critical
or Emergency mode, a number of more
involved functions are performed. First,
SAPPHIRE experiments are postponed
or canceled. Second, ground station
support for SAPPHIRE is scheduled.
Third, the schedules of other ASSET
spacecraft are reworked to account for
changes in ground station availability and
experimental loading. While these
functions are currently manual,
automated scheduling for multiple
spacecraft and multiple ground stations is
being developed.
Although not formally part of the
initial SAPPHIRE!ASSET beacon
system, automated documentation
retrieval and advanced fault isolation,

FUTURE WORK AND
INITIATIVES
The beacon monitoring system is
currently being implemented and tested
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in the SAPPHIRE and ASSET systems.
Since SAPPHIRE has not yet been
launched, the designers can take
advantage of this situation by heating,
cooling, or disconnecting various
components while other operators try to
identify and correct for such faults
without knowing what exactly has been
done. The automated system will be
compared to human-based reasoning in
order to assess the capability of the
system.
Improvements in automated fault
management are being pursued and,
where applicable, will be integrated into
the SAPPHIRE/ASSET system. This
work includes refinement of anomaly
detection techniques and the system level
corroboration of suspect telemetry
readings. Advanced work in expert
systems and model based reasoning will
also be applied to automated diagnosis
and fault recovery operations.
The current ASSET scheduling
system relies on a simple first come first
serve strategy. Look ahead scheduling
techniques will soon be instituted; this
will permit a more efficient use of the
overall space system based on user
priority, experimental value, and
available resources.
The operator interface currently
consists of a World Wide Web based
system to display and filter raw telemetry
files. More mature interfaces are being
developed in order to enhance health
analysis. One particular project consists
of displaying system status through the
use of a three dimensional representation
of the spacecraft. Using the Virtual
Reality Modeling Language, a spacecraft
model is being developed and can be
viewed through the Web. This method
displays temperatures as color, explicitly
displays orbital position and vehicle

attitude, and can be slaved to electronic
documentation.
Finally, SSDL is actively pursuing
initiatives with external organizations in
order to expand its work on the beacon
monitoring system and other projects.
As has been mentioned, cooperative
efforts with students at Tuskegee
University and the Space Engineering
School in Sweden are encouraging broad
participation at all levels of design and
implementation of the beacon network.
Also, the Air Force Satellite Control
Network has specified the SSDL
operations group as a "Pathfinder" in its
effort to reduce costs and commercialize
the AFSCN. Finally, cooperation with
NASA's Deep Space Network is
ensuring that the beacon work is relevant
and directly applicable to distributed
mission architectures.

CONCLUSIONS
Beacon monitoring is a technique
that combines on-board anomaly
detection capability with a reactive
ground system. This method provides
automated fault detection while also
saving large amounts of human and
communications resources during
nominal spacecraft operations.
This paper has discussed the
design and development of a beacon
monitoring prototype for spacecraft
operating in a shared, global mission
architecture. To begin, the fault
detection system on SAPPHIRE, while
applied to a simple spacecraft, consists of
adjustable and context-sensitive limit
checking; this capability is more
advanced from a functional perspective
than many complex spacecraft operating
today. Next, SAPPHIRE's beacon
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resolution has been explicitly detennined
through an analysis of the appropriate
levels of ground system response to
various spacecraft states. For the ground
segment, design drivers for the beacon
receiving stations have been specified.
The design and strategic installation of
these stations is being coordinated
through SSDL's academic partners.
Finally, precise mission control responses
have been defined and are being
implemented as part of the ASSET
program. These automated responses
include notification, planning, scheduling,
fault management, and document
retrieval. Each of these capabilities is
being validated to ensure safe, efficient,
and cost-effective management of the
SAPPHIRE mission.
Beacon monitoring shows great
promise as a method to drastically reduce
the costs of spacecraft operations.
Without such innovations, many of the
large scale and aggressive missions of the
future will simply not be possible.
NASA's Pluto Express project, with a
spacecraft that is subjected to a decade
of interplanetary cruise, considers the use
of beacon monitoring to be "crucial to
the success" of the mission. 7 The NASA
New Millennium Program also considers
beacon technology as a principal strategy
for the missions of the next century; a
demonstration of this technology is
currently being incorporated into the
program's Deep Space 1 mission. In
addition, the Air Force Phillips
Laboratory advocates the development
of beacon systems as a means to reduce
routine operating support for health
monitoring and to increase confidence in
the use of intelligent systems for
spacecraft operations. 8
The SAPPHIRE/ASSET beacon
prototype is providing valuable feedback

to the designers of these missions. This
experiment offers a functionally mature
system to investigate the real-world
issues involved in automated spacecraft
health monitoring. The technical
simplicity, coupled with ASSET's flexible
architecture, enables rapid
experimentation and provides an ideal
research testbed for the spacecraft
community.
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